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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DIXIE S. COX,
Plaintiff and

Appellant,
Case No.
13242

v.
MERVYN K. COX,
Defendant and Cross Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-CROSS APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action wherein Plaintiff-Appellant,
hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff, alleged mental cruelty
and asked for custody of the four minor children, a reasonable division of the property, child support, alimony
and attorney fees. Defendant and Cross Appellant, hereinafter referred to as Defendant, filed a counterclaim for
divorce on the grounds of cruelty and asked for custody
of the children, that a trust be provided for the children
in lieu of some other provision of support and that Plaintiff be awarded no alimony.
DISPOSITION I N THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted the divorce to the Defendant Mervyn K. Cox, Cross Appellant. The court initially
awarded custody of the four minor children to the De1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fendant but thereafter modified its decision and granted
custody to Plaintiff Dixie S. Cox who was the original
Appellant in this action.
After changing its decision to grant custody of the
children to Plaintiff, the court also ordered Defendant to
pay to the Plaintiff the sum of FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500.00) per month as child support. It granted
to Plaintiff a total cash payment in the nature of alimony
and property settlement in the amount of $65,000.00, to be
reduced by $5,000.00 if paid within six months, which
was done.
RELIEF SOUGHT O N APPEAL
Defendant and Cross Appellant seeks a reversal of
the lower court's decision regarding child custody. Plaintiff and Appellant seeks a modification of the property
division.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff Dixie S. Cox filed her original Complaint on
April 5, 1972, and an Amended Complaint on April 10,
1972.
Defendant Mervyn K. Cox filed his first Answer on
August 9, 1972, and his Answer to the Amended Complaint and Counterclaim on October 30, 1972.
The case was tried before the court on January 10,
11 and 12, 1973. The evidence adduced at the trial disclosed the following:

2
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The parties to the instant action were married in St.
George on June 16, 1961. (Tr. 7) Four children have
been born in that marriage. (Tr. 7)
Shortly after their marriage the couple moved to San
Francisco where Dr. Cox completed dental school. (Tr.
8,380)
Since the early stages of their marriage, Mrs. Cox
has frequently sought the attentions of other men and
has conducted herself in a flirtatious manner. (Tr. 382,
383) On occasions when the couple attended office staff
parties where Mrs. Cox was working in San Francisco,
she was flirtatious in her actions and gestures and in the
way she looked at other male personnel with whom she
worked. (Tr. 383)
After the Coxes moved back to St. George in 1964,
Mrs. Cox continued in her usual practice to attract the
attentions of other men. (Tr. 383) She was frequently
absent from home. (Tr. 383) She admitted having necked,
petted with and kissed other men on more than one
occasion since her marriage to Mr. Cox (Tr. 113, 384)
About the time that the Coxes moved into their new
home in St. George, Mrs. Cox became quite involved with
another man. (Tr. 385, 428) She accompanied this particular male companion on an overnight trip to Lake
Powell. (Tr. 385) On one occasion Dr. Cox confronted
Mrs. Cox and this male companion about some petting
he had observed between them. (Tr. 385, 428) Shortly
after that incident the Coxes moved to Provo where they

3
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lived about five months before returning to St. George.
(Tr. 385)
In the fall of 1969, about six months after she had
given birth to a child, Mrs. Cox enrolled as a student at
Dixie College. (Tr. 385) Even though she was enrolled
only on a part-time basis, she was gone most of the day
and would usually return to the library in the evenings.
(Tr 389) The children were left with a babysitter during
the day and Dr. Cox stayed with them in the evenings.
(Tr. 389) Oftentimes Mrs. Cox would not return from
school until 11:00 o'clock or later in the evenings. (Tr.
389) On one occasion in the evening Dr. Cox found Mrs.
Cox with another man in a parked car outside the college
library. (Tr. 106, 390)
On another occasion Dr. Cox came home a little
earlier than usual in the afternoon and found Mrs. Cox
in her nightgown with another man who was clad only in
Bermuda shorts. (Tr. 390) The children were present in
the home on this particular occasion. (Tr. 398)
During the early part of 1972 another of Mrs. Cox's
male friends drove by the Cox home frequently and spent
a great deal of time talking to Mrs. Cox. (Tr. 391) During
this period of time Mrs. Cox received phone calls in the
evenings, on which occasions she carried the telephone
into another room where she could not be heard. (Tr.
391) Frequently when Dr. Cox or the oldest son answered
the phone, the party on the other end would hang up.
(Tr. 391) Mrs. Cox admitted spending time with this
same individual at Pine Valley, Jacob's Lake and at the
Thunderbird Motel at Mount Carmel in March of 1972.

4
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(Tr. 72) She also admitted spending time with this same
male friend in his motel room at Mount Carmel. (Tr. 72,
115) This testimony was corroborated by two other witnesses. (Tr. 245-249, 253-257)
Mrs. Cox admitted spending time in March of 1972
with yet another man in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 76-88)
In June of 1972 Mrs. Cox returned home from one
of her trips to Salt Lake City, stayed overnight and then
left the next day, only to be absent from the home for
another ten days. (Tr. 90, 122, 284, 396-397) During this
ten-day absence Mrs. Cox failed to call or contact any
babysitter or anyone who was responsible for the care of
the children and did not inquire as to the children's welfare. (Tr. 122) No one in St. George knew where Mrs.
Cox could be reached during this absence in the event
something happened to the children. (Tr. 90) Mrs. Cox
had informed her neighbor who often tended the Cox
children that she would be staying at a certain place in
Boulder City. (Tr. 90) She admitted in testimony that she
really had no intention of staying at that particular place
in Boulder City. (Tr. 90) After Mrs. Cox had been gone
on this occasion for five days, her neighbor became worried and called the motel in Boulder City where Mrs. Cox
said she would be. (Tr. 284) She was informed that Mrs.
Cox had never been registered there. (Tr. 284) Mrs. Cox
made no contact with this neighbor during the ten-day
period. (Tr. 284) Dr. Cox also attempted without success
to locate Mrs. Cox during this ten-day absence. (Tr. 390)
In July of 1972 Mrs. Cox became infatuated with yet
another man. (Tr. 128) She accompanied this male friend
5
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and another couple on a return trip from Lake Powell.
(Tr. 91, 114) Mrs. Cox and this particular male companion arrived in St. George on a Sunday. (Tr. 92) Dr.
Cox was with the children. (Tr. 92) On the following
Monday Mrs. Cox took the children to Las Vegas. (Tr.
92) While in Las Vegas, she took the children to the
motel where her male companion was registered, ostensibly for them to have a swim. (Tr. 93)
Mrs. Cox was absent another five days in August
when she accompanied her male friend on a trip into
Wyoming. (Tr. 114)
In September Mrs. Cox spent time with this same
male companion at the Tri-arc Travel Lodge in Salt Lake
City. (Tr. 114, 261-266)
During the month of October Mrs. Cox spent time
with the same man at the Astro Motel in Cedar City. (Tr.
96, 267-269, 271-276) She also entertained him at her
home where he stayed overnight. (Tr. 94, 204, 296) When
the babysitter arrived on Sunday morning, Mrs. Cox's
male friend answered the door. (Tr. 315) On this occasion
he was bare from the waist up. (Tr. 315) The children
were in the living room at the time. (Tr. 315)
Also, in October Mrs. Cox took the children to Boise
with her where they all occupied the mobile home of her
boyfriend and spent the night. (Tr. 98-99) In November
Mrs. Cox went to Boise without the children where she
again stayed overnight with her boyfriend in his mobile
home. (Tr. 99, 114)

6
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On another occasion in November of 1972 Mrs.
flew to Las Vegas to stay with her sister. (Tr. 100)
left Las Vegas by plane on the same day she arrived
flew to Reno where she stayed overnight again with
boyfriend. (Tr. 100-101, 114)

Cox
She
and
her

In December, 1972, Mrs. Cox again drove the children to Boise where they stayed overnight in the same
mobile home with her boyfriend. (Tr. 101)
The evidence discloses that Mrs. Cox spent 80 days
out of 100 during the last six months of 1972 away from
the children and that the children were left on most of
these occasions with babysitters. (Tr. 301, 313, 322)
There is also evidence that Mrs. Cox could not tolerate her daughter, Kim (Tr. 282); that she left on one of
her excursions when Kim was ill and had to be taken to a
doctor (Tr. 129) and that she neglected Kim when she
was a baby. (Tr. 336)
The testimony at the trial revealed that Mrs. Cox is a
poor housekeeper (Tr. 345, 336, 348); that meals for the
children were often hurriedly prepared (Tr. 345) and that
the meals were lacking in good food value. (Tr. 346)
Testimony was heard in the lower court proceedings
to the effect that the children need to have more time spent
with them to help them acquire better reading skills. (Tr.
65, 110) One of the children particularly, is in need of
remedial reading attention. (Tr. 110)
Dr. Cox has always been a kind, warm and loving
father and has treated the children well. (Tr. 30, 301, 327,
328, 334, 335; R. 124)

7
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A number of affidavits have been made a part of the
record as evidence of the fact that during the eight month
period, while the children were in the temporary custody
of Dr. Cox, Mrs. Cox spent a great deal of time with her
boyfriend in the home on occasions when the children
were visiting there and that on several of these occasions
the boyfriend stayed overnight in the home when the
children likewise stayed overnight. (R. 291-296)
At the conclusion of the trial which lasted three days,
the court invited counsel for the respective parties to submit briefs. After having considered the respective briefs,
the trial court, on February 9, 1974, in open court announced its decision in which it awarded Dr. Cox the
divorce and also awarded custody of the four minor children to the Defendant, Dr. Cox. (R. 114) In so ruling the
court found that Plaintiff's actions with respect to her
lovers were lacking in propriety and judgment (R. 113114) and that it was in the best interest of the children
that their father be responsible for their care, custody and
control. (Tr. 114)
Further, the court stated that it would review its determination in August, 1973.
On February 16, 1973, immediately following the
court's ruling, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal in
this Court.
No hearing in the matter was held in August, but on
October 5, 1973, without the introduction of further evidence and without receiving testimony in addition to that
which had been previously considered by the court in

8
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January and February, the court awarded custody of the
four minor children to the Plaintiff, Mrs. Cox (October
5, 1973; Tr. 27). The court did not make any statement or
finding regarding any change of circumstances on which
to predicate awarding custody to the Plaintiff even
though the court had previously found that it was in the
best interest of the children to award custody to their
father.
The Decree of Divorce was finally entered on December 24, 1973. (R. 213) Defendant thereafter paid and
Plaintiff accepted the amount of $60,000.00 awarded to
her by the court as a property settlement.
Defendant Mervyn K. Cox filed Notice of Cross Appeal on January 21, 1974; and thereafter Plaintiff, on
January 22, 1974, filed a further Notice of Appeal.

ISSUES
The sole issue insofar as the Cross Appeal is concerned is whether the lower court erred in awarding custody
of the children to the mother, with the attendant award
of support money, after having first granted custody of
the children to the father.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE BEST INTERESTS AND WELFARE OF
THE MINOR CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES
REQUIRE T H A T THEIR CUSTODY BE
AWARDED TO THEIR FATHER.
9
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In divorce cases the welfare of the minor children is
of paramount importance in determining custody. Arends
v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328, 517 P.2d 1019 (1974); Johnson v. Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 Pac. 2d 16 (1958);
Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418 (1956);
Graziano v. Graziano, 1 Utah 2d 187, 321 P.2d 931 (1958);
Sampsell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 Pac. 2d 550 (1949);
Hyde v. Hyde, 22 Utah 2d 429, 454 P.2d 884 (1969). This
Court in the case of Sampsell v. Holt said:
"Child custody proceedings are equitable in the
highest degree, and this court has consistently held
that the best interest and welfare of the minor
child is the controlling factor in every case . . . "
(115 Utah 73, 202 P.2d 550 (1959)
Applying the above principles to the case now before the Court, it must be concluded that the best interests
and welfare of the four minor children was and will be
best served by awarding their custody to the father because of the following circumstances:
A. The Plaintiff has manifested considerable moral
deficiencies and has otherwise disqualified herself from
fulfilling her obligations as a mother.
In the case of McBroom v. McBroom, 14 Utah 2d
393, 384 P.2d 961 (1963), this Court reversed the award
of custody of the children to the mother. The facts were
not unlike those found in the case now before this Court.
T w o minor children, ages seven and nine, were involved.
The record showed that the father took his parental responsibilities seriously; that he was industrious and pro10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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vided an adequate standard of living for his family and
that he spent a large portion of his free time with his children; whereas, the mother, on the other hand, had been
persistently guilty of indiscretions, including leaving the
home on numerous occasions and staying out until the
small hours of the morning, arriving home at times in an
intoxicated condition; had employed unseemly language
in the presence of the children and on occasion surreptitiously used family funds to finance her clandestine affair
with another man; that she was a poor housekeeper; tried
to alienate the affections of the children from their father
and left the children often with babysitters.
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 18 Utah 2d 102, 417 P.2d 118
(1966), this Court affirmed the lower court's decision to
grant the divorce decree to the wife but custody of the
minor child to the father. The evidence showed that the
wife had subordinated her responsibilities as a mother by
going on a couple of excursions through several states
with a girlfriend and two ' 'gentlemen."
The Court affirmed the lower court's finding in
Francks v. Francks, 21 Utah 2d 180, 442 P.2d 937 (1968),
that the mother was unfit to have the custody of the children. The evidence showed in that case that the mother
had been guilty of indiscretions involving men other than
her husband; that she had traveled about the streets of
the town where the parties lived late at night in an intoxicated condition and that she failed to care for the
children in the manner expected of a mother in like circumstances.

11
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In Ryan v. Ryan, 17 Utah 2d 44, 404 P.2d 247 (1965),
the court found that the wife had belittled her husband
and bragged to him of her many love affairs; that she was
away from home constantly and failed to care for the children. It is significant that the evidence supporting these
findings related only to the period of time subsequent to
the separation of the parties and the commencement of the
action. On this record, the court entered judgment for the
father and found that the trial judge could reasonably
conclude that the mother was not a fit or proper person
to have custody of the children and that it was in their best
interests that the father be awarded their care, custody and
control.
The court sustained a decision of the trial court which
granted a divorce to the husband and awarded him custody
of a two-year-old child in the case of Hyde v. Hyde, 22
Utah 2d 429, 454 P.2d 884 (1969). The mother was shown
to be emotionally unstable and on one occasion had left
the child at the age of 13 months to go on a vacation and
did not return for five and one-half months. The court
emphasized the loving care the father had bestowed upon
the child in ministering to its needs and placed great stress
on the relationship between him and his daughter and the
degree of security he brought into the life of the child. In
response to the claim of superior right to the child's
custody asserted by the mother under Section 30-3-10,
Utah Code Ann. (1953), the court said:
"It will thus be seen that the defendant (wife) has
no absolute right to the custody of her child simply
because she is the mother. At best, she has an advantaged position when all things are equal. However, when things are not equal as regards the
12
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ability of the parties to care for and properly rear
the child, then any advantage customarily given to
the mother must be denied and the award made
so as to provide for the best interest and welfare of
the child." 22 Utah 2d 429, 432 (emphasis added).
In the Hyde case the court held that the mother was not
immoral, but awarded custody to the father, nevertheless.
Even though the court held in Hyde, as well as in
Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328, that Section 30-3-10,
Utah Code Ann. (1953), does not apply to divorce, it is
significant to note that in 1969 the legislature amended
Section 30-3-10 to read as follows:
"In any case of separation of husband and wife
having minor children, or whenever a marriage is
declared void or dissolved, the court shall make
such order for the future care and custody of the
minor children as it may deem just and proper. In
determining custody, the court shall consider the
best interests of the child and the past conduct and
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties
and the natural presumption that the mother is best
suited to care for young children.'9 (emphasis
added).
Divorce is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as follows:
"The legal separation of man and wife, effected,
for cause, by the judgment of a court, and either
totally dissolving the marriage relationship, or
suspending its effects so far as concerns the combination of the parties." Atherton v. Atherton, 181
U.S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544, 45 L.Ed. 794. . . . (emphasis added).
"The dissolution is termed 'divorce from the bond
of matrimony/ or, in the Latin form of the expression, 'a vinculo matrimonii. . . .' "
Black's Law Dictionary 556 (4th ed. 1968)
13
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Whether the specific language regarding dissolution
of marriage which was added to Section 30-3-10 by way
of the 1969 amendment embraces divorce may be arguable. However, it cannot be denied that the thrust and
rationale of that section applies with equal force in a
divorce situation. (The court may not have had the 1969
amendment before it when it rendered its 1969 decision
in Hyde v. Hyde.}
There is no merit in arguing that the "past conduct
and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties"
should not weigh heavily in considering the best interests
of the children. And, carrying this same rationale one
step further, if the expression "past conduct and demonstrated moral standards" is to have any meaning whatsoever, certainly the facts of the instant case demand its
application.
The Nevada Supreme Court in the case of Sisson v.
Sisson, 11 Nev. 478, 367 P.2d 98 (1961), reversed the lower
court decision and awarded custody to the husband upon
the finding that the wife and mother had lived in adultery
and had exposed the children to her adulterous living over
a continuing period of time. In that case the wife, after
separating herself from her husband, traveled with the
children from Maryland to Nevada escorted by her new
paramour. According to the record, the wife first committed adultery several weeks after arrival in Nevada.
Once initiated, that conduct continued thereafter up to
and including the time of trial, a period of about one
year. In awarding custody to the father, the Supreme Court
discussed the comparative moral standards of each party,
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which appear to be quite similar to the divergent standards of the parties in the instant case. The court's discussion was as follows:
' 'Though the tragedy of marital separation inevitably casts injury upon the children, a strenuous
effort must be made to maintain if at all possible,
that love, stability, security, and moral environment which they formerly enjoyed. It is evident
and without dispute that the father, under the circumstances of this case, could have provided the
children with as much love, with more security and
stability, and with a more wholesome moral environment than did the mother. The wife's conduct following separation is despicable. The children were not babies; they were intelligent, curious
and interested. They undoubtedly knew right from
wrong, good from bad. The oldest son was then 9,
the next 6, and the daughter 4 years old. Though
the mother professed great love and affection for
them, it became incidental to her passion for another man. Adult passions, apparently, sometimes
provoke illicit togetherness. However, we cannot
approve such conduct, especially its exhibition before beloved children. This is not a case where
adultery is but an isolated occurrence. To the contrary, the wife-mother deliberately subjected her
children to a shameful, immoral, unwholesome environment of more than a year's duration. That a
more satisfactory solution was available for the
children's welfare, pending divorce, is without
question. W e note that the father was not found
unfit. Indeed, such a finding was not possible
under the facts here present.
ef

We have not found authority from any courts
which would support a custody award to the
mother, under circumstances like these. The adultery with which we are here concerned probably
did not affect the husband-wife relationship, for
15
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reasons heretofore related, but it must have caused
terrible harm to the children." 367 P.2d 98 at 102,
103 (emphasis added).
Also, in the case of Lantis v. Lantis, 86 Nev. 885, 478
P.2d 163 (1970), the Supreme Court of Nevada held that
it was not necessary that the mother be found unfit before she could be deprived of custody of an infant child
previously awarded to her, where there was an express
finding of fitness of the father. The court commented on
the deep concern of the trial court for the welfare and
best interests of the child, and its determination that the
mother's conduct indicated a lack of maturity and responsibility.
The evidence now before this Court in this case
clearly demonstrates that the controlling habit of the
Plaintiff has been and continues to be the satisfaction of
her own personal desires and inclinations in total disregard of the erosive effect of this conduct on her children.
She has not only indulged during her marriage in a continuing series of flirtations and serious and aggravated
indiscretions strongly suggesting actual adultery, but she
has allowed these immoral episodes seriously and adversely to affect the best interests and welfare of the children by repeated and extended absences from the home
(Tr. 90, 114, 122, 284, 301, 313, 322, 383, 385, 389, 396397) and by directly exposing the children (Daniel, age
9; Jeffrey, age 7; Kimberly, age 6; and Joseph, age 3)
on multiple occasions to the sordid reality of her immoral
alliances. (Tr. 93-94, 98-99, 101, 204, 296, 315, 390, 391;
R. 291-296) Although past conduct and demonstrated
moral standards on the part of the Plaintiff to which the
16
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children were directly exposed are sufficiently repulsive,
standing alone, to justify the Court in awarding custody
to the father, the Plaintiff's past conduct and numerous
immoral excursions away from home without the children
bespeak the fact that she is not a fit and proper person
to have custody of the four minor children notwithstanding the trial court's obvious compassionate finding that
Plaintiff, as well as Defendant, was a fit person to have
such custody. (Tr. 72, 76-88, 90-91, 96, 99-101, 106, 113115, 122, 128, 245-249, 253-257, 261-269, 271-276, 284,
382-385, 390, 396-397, 428)
Many of Plaintiff's encounters with other men were
established at trial by her own admissions. (Tr. 72, 88,
91, 96, 99-102, 111, 113-115) Other such encounters were
either established or corroborated by nine independent
witnesses (Tr. 172, 245-250, 252-257, 261-278, 284, 293,
296, 314-315), in addition to testimony of Defendant.
(Tr. 382-385, 390-393, 398, 428)
One witness testified that Plaintiff had left the children with babysitters about 80% of the time during a
particular six-month period. (Tr. 301, 313)
Another witness testified that in the same six-month
period the children were left under the care of babysitters way over half of the time; that Plaintiff "has been
gone more than she has been home." (Tr. 322)
During Plaintiff's ten-day absence from her home in
June of 1972, she failed to call or contact any babysitter
or anyone who was responsible for the care of the chil17
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dren to inquire as to their welfare. (Tr. 122) Neither her
husband nor anyone who had any responsibility for the
children on that occasion knew where they could contact
Plaintiff in case of emergency. (Tr. 90)
One of the several babysitters testified that she tended
the children on 12 of the 31 days in October of 1972 and
that she had tended the children more than that in September, 1972. (Tr. 286-287)
In 1969, about six months after she had given birth
to one of their children, Plaintiff enrolled as a student at
Dixie College. (Tr. 385) There was no reason for this
"educational" activity except to satisfy the social requirements or urges of Plaintiff. She was gone most of the
day and usually returned to the library in the evenings.
(Tr. 389) The children were left with a babysitter during
the day and their father stayed with them in the evenings.
(Tr. 389)
During another period of time Plaintiff enrolled in a
12-week charm and dance school in Las Vegas. (Tr. 384)
While attending this course, she was gone two or three
days each week. (Tr. 385) At that time there were three
children who were left with a babysitter during the day
and with their father in the evenings. (Tr. 385)
B. Defendant-Cross Appellant and father of the
four minor children is morally and in every other respect
fit for the custody of the children, has manifest an abundance of love and concern for the children and will have
the assistance of others who also love the children and have
experience in caring for them.
18
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The record from the trial below is void of any evidence which casts a doubt upon the past conduct or moral
standards of the father in any respect which could call into
question his fitness to have custody of the four minor children.
The record below is replete with evidence of the
father's unfaltering love and attention to the children
and the love they reciprocate for their father.
It was their father who stayed with the children in the
evenings on the numerous occasions when the Plaintiff
was indulging herself with her various male companions.
(Tr. 91, 102, 122-125, 129, 335, 350, 389, 396, 435)
Defendant has always been a kind, warm and loving
father and has treated the children well. (Tr. 30, 301,
327, 328, 334, 335, 401) Defendant was in the habit, prior
to the separation of the parties, of bathing the children
and washing their heads. (Tr. 431) He is also accustomed
to ironing the children's clothes. (Tr. 435)
In the case of McBroom v. McBroom, 14 Utah 2d
393, 384 P.2d 961 (1963), the court took into consideration the fact that the father had demonstrated a willingness and ability to care for the children more adequately;
that his mother had agreed to move into the home to
supervise the children; that another woman would be
hired to care for household tasks and that he had the
firm support of other relatives who appear willing to help.
Such is also the case with the father in the instant
action. Not only is he financially able to continue to pro19
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vide the necessities of life and a comfortable home but he
has expressed his intentions, if awarded custody, to spend
time with the children when he is not working. (Tr.
402) He plans to work approximately four days a week
from about 8:30 a.m. until 4:30 p.m., which would allow
him to spend considerable time with the children. (Tr.
402) He has also talked to various dependable individuals
about assisting him in caring for the children and providing a proper home environment for them. (Tr. 402)
Such things as meals, bathing, washing, ironing and clothing would be properly maintained. (Tr. 403)

C. Based upon considerations of their total environment, including the only home they have known, and their
friendships and attachments through school, church and
social contacts, the best interests of the children would he
better served by awarding custody to their father.
As has been previously stated, the court, on February
9, 1973, awarded custody to the Defendant, specifically
finding that it was in the best interest of the four minor
children to be in the care, custody and control of their
father. In so ruling, the court expressed concern over the
lack of propriety and judgment exhibited in the actions of
the Plaintiff.
Approximately eight months later, during which
time there appeared to be no change in attitude or disposition of the parties, the court reversed itself and awarded
custody to the Plaintiff without any specific showing or
finding that it was in the best interests of the children to
do so.
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In the October hearing, when custody was transferred to the Plaintiff, there was no evidence offered or
received to show any change of circumstances to justify
a change of custody.
In point of fact, the evidence shows that the Plaintiff continued to exhibit immaturity and lack of responsibility through her indulgence in illicit relationships during the times in which the children were visiting with her
in her home in St. George. (R. 291-295) In the language of
the Sis son case quoted above, "The children were not
babies; they were intelligent, curious, and interested. They
undoubtedly knew right from wrong, good from bad."
Even though the Plaintiff in the instant case may express
love and affection for the children, it is apparent that
any love she may have is incidental to her passion for
other men and the gratification of her own selfish desires.
This is not a case where adultery is but an isolated occurrence. The Plaintiff in the instant case has deliberately
subjected her children on numerous occasions to a shameful, immoral and unwholesome environment of more
than a year's duration.
One of the concerns expressed by the court was that
the Plaintiff contemplated marrying one of her male
companions and moving with her children and her new
husband to Boise, Idaho. (R. 113-114) This concern has
indeed become a reality, which action has not only disrupted the lives of the children with references to their
stability in school, church and the social exvironments to
which they were accustomed, but also forced them into a
situation where they are confronted daily with the reminder of their mother's immoral extra-marital conduct.
21
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SUMMARY
The children should be allowed to stay with their
father in the home in which they have been reared, to
offset by the love and security that this disposition will
afford, the traumatic experience that this divorce and the
misconduct of the Plaintiff have thrust upon them. In
this home they will continue to attend the same church and
schools, to play with the same friends and cousins and the
divorce of their parents will not so completely disrupt
their lives and routines and devastate their emotions as
it will if custody is granted to the Plaintiff.
W e respectfully submit that the judgment of the
lower court regarding custody should be reversed and the
custody of the four minor children returned to their father
who has demonstrated his being entitled to have such care,
custody and control.
Respectfully submitted,
Arthur H. Nielsen
Randall L. Romrell
NIELSEN, CONDER, HANSEN
A N D HENRIOD
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
V. Pershing Nelson
ALDRICH A N D NELSON
Fidelity Building
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Defendant-Cross
Appellant
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